EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FLORENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R No. 32

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AMONG WEST EUROPEAN ELITES AND PUBLICS.

by

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NOVEMBER 1982

Paper presented at workshop on Empirical Elite Research, at European University Institute, Florence, October 4-8, 1982.

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

Printed in Italy in November 1982
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The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society

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I. Introduction.

The cleavage structures underlying politics in Western nations have changed profoundly during the past two decades. As a result, the textbook definitions of "Left" and "Right" (or in the American context, of "liberal" and "conservative") are only partly valid today.

Political cleavages can be viewed as relatively stable patterns of polarization, in which given groups support given policies or parties, while other groups support opposing policies or parties. For almost a generation, the nature of both the groups and the policy issues aligned with Left and Right have been changing.

In the classic model of industrial society, political polarization was a direct reflection of social class conflict. The working class was considered the natural base of support for the Left--that is, of support for change in an egalitarian direction. And the key issue underlying the Left-Right polarization was conflict over ownership of the means of production and the distribution of income.

As industrializing society gives way to advanced industrial society, there is a growing tendency for politics to polarize along a new dimension that cuts across this conventional Left-Right axis. Increasingly, support for social change comes from a Post-Materialist base, largely middle class in origin. This

group has raised a new set of issues that tend to dominate the contemporary political agenda.

Today many of the most controversial issues and the most important political movements polarize along a Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension. The environmentalist movement, the opposition to nuclear power, the peace movement, the women's movement, the limits to growth movement, the consumer advocacy movement--all of these are manifestations of a political cleavage dimension that is only loosely related to conflict over ownership of the means of production and traditional social class conflict. The fact that these movements have taken the center of the stage in contemporary politics reflects a long-term shift in the value priorities of Western publics (Inglehart, 1977, 1981).

Thus far, this new axis of polarization has had only a limited impact on voting behavior: long-established political party loyalties, reinforced by party organizations and institutional linkages with labor unions and churches, are highly resistent to change. People continue to vote for the parties prevailing in their milieu, which their parents or even grandparents may have supported. To a considerable degree, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were correct in speaking of a "freezing of party alignments" dating back to the era when modern mass party systems were first established. But though deep-rooted political party alignments continue to shape voting behavior in many countries, they do not reflect the dynamics of the new politics. The new axis of conflict is more likely to give rise

to active protest and support for change than the class-based axis that became institutionalized decades ago.

This disparity between traditional political party alignments and the dynamics of contemporary issue-polarization places existing party systems under chronic stress. For extended periods of time, the traditional party systems may appear to be in business as usual--until suddenly, a basic restructuring occurs. Sometimes the change manifests itself in the emergence of new political parties, as in The Netherlands or Italy. But the capture of long-established parties by new elites is a more promising avenue to success, for major political parties represent great psychological and institutional investments; established voting patterns are not lightly discarded. But this inertia means that party alignments can lag behind social change until the major ideological cleavage cut almost orthogonally across established party spaces. When this happens, the alternatives are Realignment or Dealignment: the parties must either reorient themselves or risk being split--or suffer a gradual erosion of partisan loyalties. In many western nations, from Great Britain and West Germany to the United States, that situation prevails today.

2. From Class-based to Value-based Political Polarization.

The idea that politics is a struggle between rich and poor can be traced back to Plato. But unquestionably the most influential modern version of this idea has been Karl Marx's argument that throughout industrial society, social class conflict is inevitably the central fact of political life.

Marx's influence is reflected not only in a vast literature of social criticism, but also in the existence of an entire family of political parties that were inspired by his writings and, in varying degrees, purport to be guided by his analysis today.

The idea that politics in industrial societies is a class struggle has received strong support in the findings of empirical social research. Thus, in his classic and immensely influential work, Political Man, Lipset (1960: 223-224) concludes that "The most important single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Left, while the higher income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Right."

In another influential study based on data from four English-speaking democracies, Alford (1963) found that in virtually every available survey, manual workers were more likely to vote for parties of the Left than non-manual workers. Calculating a "class-voting index" (obtained by subtracting the percentage of non-manual respondents voting for the Left from the percentage of manual respondents voting for the Left) Alford found a mean index of +16 for the United States, and one of +40 for Great Britain.

More recent empirical analyses have demonstrated that religion is also a major factor, but confirmed that social class is one of the most powerful bases of political cleavage, towering above other variables, when not dominated by ethnic cleavages such as religion, language or race (see for example, Rose and Urwin, 1969; Lijphart, 1971, 1979; Rose [ed], 1974).

Nevertheless, there were grounds for believing that a paramount role for social class voting was not an immutable fact of political life. Campbell et al (1960) argued that class voting in the United States, to a considerable extent, reflected a cohort effect: it was most pronounced among the generation that came of age during the Great Depression, and weaker among both older and younger groups. They speculated that class voting may vary inversely with prosperity, with substantial time lags due to cohort effects. Inglehart (1971, 1977) carried this line of reasoning farther, presenting evidence of a pervasive intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist value priorities among the publics of advanced industrial society. The Post-Materialist outlook is linked with having spent one's formative years in conditions of economical and physical security; hence it is far more prevalent among the postwar generation than among older cohorts, throughout Western Society; and tends to be concentrated among the more prosperous strata of any given age group.

The political implications are significant and at first seem paradoxical. Post-Materialists give top priority to such goals as a sense of community and the non-material quality of life, but they live in societies that have traditionally emphasized economic gains above all. Hence, though they tend to come from the most privileged and economically most favored strata of society, they tend to be relatively dissatisfied with the kind of society in which they live, and relatively favorable to social change. Though recruited from the higher income groups that have

traditionally supported the parties of the Right, they themselves tend to support the parties of the Left when they become politically engaged.

Conversely, when Post-Materialist issues (such as environmentalism, the women's movement, unilateral disarmament, opposition to nuclear power, etc.) become central, they may stimulate a Materialist reaction in which much of the working class sides with the Right, to reaffirm the traditional Materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security and domestic law and order.

The rise of Post-Materialist issues, therefore, tends to neutralize political polarization based on social class. Though long-established party loyalties and institutional ties link the working class to the Left and the middle class to the Right, the social basis of <u>new</u> support for the parties and policies of the Left tends to come disproportionally from middle class sources. But, at the same time, the Left parties become vulnerable to a potential split between their Post-Materialist Left, intensely engaged in new issues, and their traditional Materialist constituency.

In 1972, this phenomenon temporarily shattered the Democratic Party in the United States; in 1981, it contributed to a possibly more permanent division of the British Left, split between a Labour Party that had been captured by a neo-Marxist and neutralist Left wing, and a new Social Democric Party that at won over much of the party's mass constituency. Throughout the past decade, a somewhat similar cleavage has threatened to split

the German Social Democratic Party, torn between a Post-Materialist "Young Socialist" wing, and the labor-oriented main body.

In multi-party systems with straight proportional representation, the viability of new parties is considerably greater than in the countries just discussed. Hence, in The Netherlands, Scandanavia and Italy this phenomenon has given rise to small but influential Post-Materialist parties (Lijphart, 1981): Leftist in policy orientation, their social base is largely middle class.

After a lull in the middle 1970s, West European politics again show widespread political upheaval. And despite the economic difficulties of the present period, Post-Materialist issues continue to play a major role. When demonstrations take place, they are not directed against unemployment or declining real income--on the contrary, most of them are aimed at preventing the construction of nuclear power plants, highways, airports, military installations, hydroelectric dams and other projects that might reduce unemployment. Now, as earlier, labor is concerned with unemployment, wages, and inflation; but political activism continues to reflect mainly Post-Materialist concerns. Recent economic uncertainty seems to have slowed the growth of Post-Materialism in Western Europe but not stopped it: a Post-Materialist value type was more widespread at the end of the 1970s than at the start of that decade, and had shifted from being predominantly a student phenomenon, to being an important influence among elites (Inglehart, 1981).

Our hypotheses concerning the emergence of a Post-Materialist Left imply a long term decline in social class voting. Has it taken place?

Alford (1963: 226) examined this possibility himself, and concluded that "There had been no substantial shift in the class bases of American politics since the 1930's, despite the prosperity since World War II and despite the shifts to the Right during the Eisenhower era."

Alford seems to have been correct in his interpretation of the evidence he examined; indeed, social class voting in the United States actually rose during the period he dealt with, peaking about 1948 as the generation of the New Deal matured. But more recent studies by Glenn (1973), Abramson (1975, 1978), Books and Reynolds (1975), Inglehart (1977), Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt (1981) and Stephens (1981) support the conclusion that during the past few decades there has been a secular decline in social class voting, not only in the United States but throughout much of the Western world.

This tendency is probabilistic, not deterministic. A variety of factors affect the voters' choice--among them, long-term party loyalties (sometimes transmitted from one generation to the next), religious and other group ties, the personalities of given candidates, the relative positions of the various parties on key issues, and the current economic situation. These factors can cause large fluctuations in class voting from one election to the next within a given nation, and help account for wide variations in class voting between countries. But a growing

body of evidence points to the conclusion that, underlying these fluctuations and cross national differences, a long term decline in class voting took place during the past 30 years. Thus, in the revised edition of Political Man Lipset (1981) updates his own earlier conclusions about social class voting with a new chapter containing the evidence shown in Figure 1. The fluctuations we see in Figure 1 are sometimes dramatic, but the downward trend is unmistakable and seems to have continued into the 1970's, despite the economic setbacks of that decade. As Figure 1 demonstrates, class voting in the United States fell almost to zero in 1972, when the McGovernites captured the Democratic Presidential nomination, mobilizing the Post-Materialist constituency very effectively, but also bringing a massive desertion of working class voters. Many of the latter returned to their traditional party allegiance, under a centrist candidate in 1976; but class voting in the United States remains low--and even this modest level largely reflects its persistence among older voters: among the youngest American age cohorts, it is close to zero (Abramson, 1978). West European data show a similar pattern: for the European Community as a whole during 1976-1979, the class-voting index for those more than 54 years old was +24; for those aged 18-34, it was only +15.

(Figure 1 about here)

Class voting seems to have declined. But in order to grasp the implications of this phenomenon, we need to know why it has taken place. Does it reflect an intergenerational value change of the type we have hypothesized? If so, we can anticipate that



Figure 1. The Trend in Class Voting in Four Western Democracies, 1948-1980.

From: Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (second edition) Baltimore: Johns-Hopkins University Press, 1981.

it will tend to continue, as younger, relatively Post-Materialist age groups replace the oldest, most Materialist-oriented age cohorts in the electorate. Or is the phenomenon a direct reflection of current economic conditions--in which case we would expect a reversal of the downward trend in the present era, and a possible return to the politics of social class conflict that characterized the 1930's and 1940's? Or does the pattern in Figure 1 simply reflect the personalities and strategies of the political parties in these four countries during this particular period--a pattern that would be dispelled by evidence from a broader range of countries or from a longer series of time points?

These are part of a series of questions that will be addressed in this article. For the decline of social class voting is only one aspect of a broader transformation of political polarization. And in some ways, class voting patterns give an understated impression of what has been going on. For voting behavior is shaped, to a considerable extent, by an internalized sense of political party identification in given individuals, and by institutional ties between given parties and given social networks, such as labor union or church. In so far as this is true, voting behavior has a good deal of inertia; it does not necessarily respond to current conditions, but may continue to reflect old alignments long after the circumstances that gave rise to them have changed. Other indicators of political polarization may reflect the dynamics of contemporary politics more directly.

For example, one of the standard questions in the Euro-Barometer surveys sponsored by the European Communities, asks whether the respondent favors revolutionary political change, gradual reform, or defense of the established order. One can use responses to this item to measure social class polarization, by examing the differences between the responses of those with manual and non-manual occupations.

Because this item does not require the respondent to indicate a political party preference, it is less contaminated by the effects of political party loyalties than is the Alford Index--and should reflect the decline (or rise) of social class polarization even more sharply and more immediately than does the latter. But if our supposition is true that this indicator reflects current influences more than party identification does, in the event of sharply rising social class conflict, it would show more class polarization than the Alford index.

We will also use the respondent's self-placement on a Left-Right ideological scale as an indicator of political polarization. Previous research has demonstrated that this measure reflects a partisanship component, as well as an ideological component (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976). Some respondents place themselves at a given point on this scale because that is where the party they support is conventionally located; placing oneself on the Left (or the center, or Right) is more or less a surrogate for party identification. For these people, Left-Right self-placement would have much the same inertia as does party identification itself.

For many respondents, however, this scale taps one's overall ideological position: it seems to be a summary measure of one's stand on the most important current political issues, analogous to the first factor in a principal components factor analysis. Insofar as this is true, our hypotheses imply that the political meaning of Left and Right (or of liberal and conservative, in the American sense) has been changing. With the rise of new issues, identification with the "Left" increasingly would come to connote support for new causes such as environmentalism, with a diminishing tendency to evoke the classic issues such as nationalization of industry. Similarly, self-placement on the Left would have a declining linkage with working-class status.

To some observers, this prospect seems almost inconceivable. Commenting on a surprisingly weak observed correlation between Left-Right self placement and social class, Budge, Crewe and Farlie (1976:135) argue that "In our opinion the absence of a class influence on the Left-Right continuum is somewhat surprising and must raise doubts about its validity. For if the working class are not substantially located to the Left and the middle class to the Right, what meaning does the continuum have?"

If we define the Left as that portion of the spectrum supported by the working class, then this finding does, of course, invalidate Left-Right self-placement. But this is a circular and rather fruitless definition of the Left-Right dimension. If, as we argue, this dimension is a summary measure of one's overall ideological position--based on the issues that are most salient at a given time--then the relationship between

the Left or Right and any given social group is an empirical question, and one that is subject to change over time. We will present evidence that the Left-Right ideological dimension does, in fact, tend to assimilate whatever issues are most salient--and that among mass publics, its meaning has, to a surprising degree, already shifted to reflect the new politics dimension.

The hypotheses underlying this article can be summarized as follows:

> Hypothesis 1: A new issues dimension has attained salience, along with the economic issues dimension that conventionally has been considered the basis of political polarization. This dimension has arisen recently enough so that it has not yet been assimilated into a generally accepted Left-Right dimension. By contrast, the clerical/anti-clerical split, long viewed as an independent cleavage, cutting orthogonally across the class-based Left-Right dimension in such countries as France and Italy, has now become largely assimilated to a conventional Left-Right partisanship dimension in these countries. In the long run, something like this will probably happen to the new non-economic issues dimension, but for the time being it retains a relatively large degree of autonomy. Because the issues linked with this dimension have not yet been resolved or institutionalized, they constitute a more potent source of discontent and support for change than does the conventional Left-Right dimension.
>
> Hypothesis 2: Closely linked with the rise of a new issues dimension has been the rise of a new axis of group polarization, along side the familiar working class-middle class polarization (which has largely absorbed the clerical/anti-clerical split, in the relevant countries). The growing saliency of both the new issues dimension, and this new axis of group polarization, reflects a shift in the priorities of Western peoples.

The sources of these structural changes can be traced on two levels: at the individual level, the emergence of a politically active and articulate Post-Materialist minority in recent decades, has had a major impact on both the issue agenda and the group basis of politics in Western nations. Placing greater

importance on the social and esthetic quality of life than on economic and physical security, the Post-Materialists have emphasized new issues (such as environmentalism) or brought a new perspective to ageless ones (such as military expenditures). Not only are the Post-Materialists themselves more apt to respond to these issues than to the classic labor versus management issues; but by bringing them to the center of the stage, they have sometimes engendered a Materialist reaction that mobilizes segments of the working class, as well as the traditional middle-class, in defense of Materialist values--and in opposition to proposed social change. Though a minority, the Post-Materialists now tend to control the issue agenda; and their impact tends to reshape patterns of group polarization.

At the societal level, these shifts can be viewed as a logical response to changing circumstances. Economic issues are less urgent at a high level of economic development then at a low one: economic growth is almost necessarily given top priority by poor societies, once it is realized that it is possible, and can bring an end to starvation. But at a high level of development, economic growth may no longer be a means to avoid hunger, but a means to provide the average family with a second car--a goal that not only has less urgency, but may introduce elements of noise, pollution and crowding that can become counterproductive to the maximization of human utilities.

At both individual and societal levels, there tend to be significant time lags between economic change and its political consequences--which is why the new politics began to emerge a a

number of years after the various postwar economic miracles. At the individual level, political change is linked with the process of intergenerational population replacement: Post-Materialism began to have a major impact only when the Post-War generation reached politically-relevant age in the late 1960s. At the societal level, political change theoretically could take place rather quickly--except that it tends to be retarded by social networks and institutional ties that can be highly resistant to change.

These are the central hypotheses that concern us here. A secondary group of hypotheses can be derived from them, which we will sketch forth briefly:

> Hypothesis 3: Social class voting varies inversely with prosperity within a given nation.

This hypothesis follows directly from our theory of value change; but it could also be stated in more general terms: when economic issues are most salient, the publics of industrialized societies tend to polarize according to social class; when non-economic issues become central, political polarization takes place across class lines.

> Hypothesis 3.1: Overall, there has been a substantial decline in social class voting in Western nations during the period since World War II.

This hypothesis simply reflects the fact that there were sizeable increases in real income per capita, and in the standard of living, in all of these societies during this period. The trend is not irreversible, however: if an economic crisis comparable to the Great Depression occurred during the 1980's, we would anticipate a resurgence of social class voting.

Hypothesis 4: Class voting varies inversely with polarization according to Materialist/Post-Materialist values.

A major reason for the decline in class voting has been the emergence, within the past two decades, of a significant and influential Post-Materialist minority. Within any given nation Post-Materialists are significantly less likely to vote along class lines than are Materialists; moreover, a Materialist reaction is most likely to occur where Post-Materialism is relatively salient.

Hypothesis 5: Religious voting is not directly undermined by the rise of Post-Materialist issues.

Unlike class voting, the correlation between religiosity and support for the Left is undisturbed when Post-materialist issues become central: Post-Materialists have low rates of church attendance--and both of these characteristics are linked with support for the Left. This fact may have contributed to the remarkable persistence of religious voting in many countries--a persistence that is surprising if one's expectations are shaped by economic determinism. Religious voting may eventually decline, if there is declining interest in religion itself--but unlike class voting, it is not inherently dissonant with the rise of Post-Materialist issues. Quite the contrary, polarization over these issues can give religious voting a new lease on life.

Hypothesis 6: Social class voting tends to remain relatively strong where political party identification is strong.

Political party identification tends to resist changes in established political patterns, influencing an individual to remain loyal to whatever party he supported in the past, and even

whatever party his parents supported. Hence, if social class voting was strong in the past and has been weakened by relatively recent factors, it will be preserved most strongly among those groups and nations that are characterized by relatively strong loyalties to established parties.

> Hypothesis 6.1: But in the long run, political party identification itself tends to be eroded gradually, by the rise of new cleavages that are dissonant with existing alignments (Inglehart and Hochstein, 1972).

> Hypothesis 7: The impact of Post-Materialism will be greatest on those forms of political polarization that are least strongly linked with established party loyalties. Conversely, class cleavages will retain their greatest strength among those forms of polarization most closely linked with political party loyalties.

Political party identification itself is reshaped only gradually by the rise of new values; hence it helps to preserve old patterns among those variables highly correlated with it. Where voting behavior is closely related to political party loyalties, it will polarize according to individual values only slightly more than party identification itself. Left-Right self-placement tends to reflect political party ties in part, but it also reflects one's reaction to current issues. Hence, it is more likely to polarize according to one's values. Finally, support for social change is not necessarily tied to political party loyalties at all. Hence, polarization over this basic super-issue will reflect individual value priorities above all; being only minimally constrained by party ties, it will show a minimum level of social class polarization, under current conditions.

> Hypothesis 8: Class voting will be strongest among the older cohorts and value-oriented voting strongest among the

younger cohorts. This will also hold true for other forms of political polarization.

If our assumption is correct that class voting was relatively strong in the past, but is declining due to intergenerational population replacement, given age cohorts will show contrasting characteristics, reflecting the circumstances that prevailed during their formative years.

3. Two Faces of Left and Right.

Our first hypothesis is that a new dimension of political polarization has become salient, reflecting a polarization between Materialist and Post-Materialist issue preferences. In order to test this hypothesis, let us examine the dimensionality of a battery of 13 items included in surveys carried out in all nine nations belonging to the European Community in Spring, 1979. Surveys were conducted simultaneously with: (1) representative national samples of the publics of each nation (as part of the Euro-Barometer surveys) and (2) a sample of 742 candidates running for seats in the European Parliament. The latter sample should give a reasonably good indication of the issue preferences of West European political elites. It includes politicians belonging to all of the important political parties in all nine nations. In social background, these respondents resemble the members of the respective national parliaments (in which many of them hold seats). Our battery of questions was designed to measure preferences on a wide range of issues: not only those that have become salient in recent years (such as nuclear power, terrorism and abortion) but also such classic economic issues as

nationalization of industry, redistribution of income and the government role in the economy.

This battery was worded as follows:

> We'd like to hear your views on some important political issues. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following proposals? How strongly do you feel? (Show CARD)
> 1. Stronger public control should be exercised over the activities of multinational corporations.
> 2. Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs.
> 3. Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income.
> 4. More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism.
> 5. Public ownership of private industry should be expanded.
> 6. Government should play a greater role in the management of the economy.
> 7. Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defence.
> 8. Women should be free to decide for themselves in matters concerning abortion.
> 9. Employees should be given equal representation with share holders on the governing boards of large companies.
> 10. Economic aid to Third World countries should be increased.
> 11. Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment against pollution.
> 12. Stronger measures should be taken to protect the Rights of individuals to express their own political views.
> 13. Economic aid to the less developed regions of the European Community should be increased.

The respondent was shown a card, offering the following categories for response to each item: "Agree Strongly," "Agree," "Disagree," and "Disagree Strongly."

Table 1 shows the results of a factor analysis with varimax rotation, based on responses to this battery of items, among candidates for the European Parliament. For reasons of space, only the results from a pooled sample of 742 candidates from all nine nations are shown here; separate nation-by-nation analyses show essentially the same patterns, with minor variations.

(Table 1 about here)

The expected pattern emerges, with striking clarity. Our first factor is based on six items designed to tap the classic economic concerns; the most sensitive indicators of this dimension are one's attitude toward government management and ownership of the economy. The second factor shows a quite distinct content: its four highest-loading items are those designed to tap the new politics. Nuclear energy and abortion are new issues--they literally did not exist as political issues a generation ago; terrorism has a long history, but its present form is new. Defense, obviously, is not a new issue--quite the contrary, it, is probably the oldest concern of the state. But domestic opposition to one's own defense establishment took on new overtones during the conflict in Vietnam, when opposition to the war came to be motivated much less by traditional conservative reasons (above all, opposition to heavy government expenditures and higher taxes), than by a Post-Materialist concern for the impact of the war on the purported enemy. Though the issue is ancient, both the motivations and social bases that underlie it have changed. A fifth item--concerning public ownership of industry--clearly does not fit our expectations; but it is by far the weakest-loading item. Its presence here signals the fact that this question plays a highly salient and pivotal role in the ideological structure of professional politicians--something that is not equally true of mass publics. As we will shortly demonstrate (see Table 3 below), the issue preferences of Western publics are structured in an almost identical fashion:

Table 1

ISSUE POSITIONS OF CANDIDATES TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:
FACTOR ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION

(All loadings above .300 are shown)

I. Economic Left-Right (37%)		II. Non-Economic Left-Right (14%)	
More government management of economy	.764	Stronger measures against terrorism	.776
More public ownership of industry	.708	Develop nuclear energy	.733
Reduce income inequality	.642	Stronger defense effort	.727
Public control of multinationals	.633	Women free to choose abortion	-.574
Equal representation for employees	.615	More public ownership of industry	-.451
More aid to Third World	.372		

Source: Survey of Candidates for European Parliament conducted in Spring, 1979. For sampling details see Inglehart, Rabier, Gordon and Sorenson, "Broader Powers for the European Parliament? The Attitudes of Candidates," European Journal of Political Research March, 1980.

similar analysis also reveals two dimensions, based on almost exactly the same items as those in Table 1--except that "public ownership of industry" does not load on the second factor.

We hypothesize that the second dimension reflects a Materialist/Post-Materialist polarization, rather than traditional social class conflict. Whether or not this is the case remains to be demonstrated.. First, we must clear up some questions, concerning the degree to which we actually have two distinct dimensions.

Varimax rotation can identify two or more independent components of an attitudinal structure even if the variables are only relatively distinct. And among the elites, these two dimensions are only relatively distinct. The mean correlation among the three highest-loading items on the first dimension is .50; the mean correlation among the three highest-loading items on the second dimension is .45; the mean correlation between the two sets of items is -.33. In other words, at the elite level we find two distinguishable issue clusters, but they are by no means unrelated. In a principal components analysis, all of these items show substantial loadings on what could be interpreted as an overarching Left-Right ideological dimension, or super-issue.

Nevertheless, it is meaningful to distinguish between these two issue clusters. Indeed, unless we do so, we lose sight of a major shift in the meaning and social bases of Left and Right. Moreover, though they tend to be integrated into an overarching Left-Right structure at the elite level, among the general public the two clusters are not only relatively distinct--they are

almost totally unrelated in an absolute sense. To be specific: the mean correlation among the three items concerning public ownership, public management, and income inequality, is .28; the mean correlation among the items concerning terrorism, nuclear energy and defense is .23; but the mean correlation between the two sets of items is -.05: at the public level, we are dealing with two completely independent dimensions. In part, this finding reflects a pervasive tendency for mass publics to show less constraint than elites. But it is also true (as we will see below) that the two issue clusters are fundamentally different in nature and antecedents.

The fact that the two issue dimensions are distinct and relatively independent does not mean that they are unrelated to a broader Left-Right orientation, even among mass publics. For politics frequently demands a dichotomous choice: a politician must join or oppose a given coalition; or a voter one must choose between Giscard and Mitterrand. The effort to build a winning coalition provides a powerful incentive to depict politics in bipolar terms that dichotomize between the good guys and the bad guys. The Left-Right image is an oversimplication, but an almost inevitable one that in the long run tends to assimilate all important issues.

We suggested above that the Left-Right dimension, as a political concept, is a higher-level abstraction used to summarize one's stand on the important political issues of the day. It serves the function of organizing and simplifying a complex political reality, providing an overall orientation

toward a potentially limitless number of issues, political parties and social groups. The pervasive use of the Left-Right concept through the years in Western political discourse testifies to its usefulness. Insofar as political reality can be reduced to one underlying dimension, then one can readily distinguish between friend and foe, and between the good and bad positions on given issues, in terms of relative distances from one's own position on this dimension. To be sure, social conflict is rarely if ever unidimensional. Thus, to speak in terms of Left and Right is always an oversimplication--but an extremely useful one. In order to individually describe the relationships between a mere dozen issues or parties, one would need to make sixty-six pairwise comparisons; fourteen issues or parties would require ninety-one comparisons. This degree of cognitive complexity is hopelessly unmanageable in practical politics. Ideologues and politicians almost inevitably tend to sum up the alternatives in terms of such all-embracing concepts as "Left" and "Right" that provide a relatively simple guideline for forming alliances or appealing for mass support. The core meaning of the Left-Right dimension, we believe, is whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction: typically, the Left (or, in America, the liberal side) supports change, while the Right opposes it (see Lipset et al. [1954]). It is important to specify the <u>direction</u> of desired change: while conservative movements may be content to defend the status quo, reactionary ones may seek change in the direction of greater <u>inequality</u> between classes, nationalities or other groups.

The utility of the Left-Right concept rests on the fact that, through the years and from one setting to another, the basic political conflicts quite often do reflect a polarization between those seeking social change and those opposing it. The concept is sufficiently general that as new issues arise, they usually can be fitted into the framework: the specific kinds of change may change, but the question of more or less equality is usually involved, whether it be between social classes, nationalities, races or sexes. Moreover, there is some continuity in which groups seek change: generally, those who are least favorably situated in a given social order are most likely to support change. Hence over the years, certain social groups and political parties may come to be identified with either the "Left" or the "Right."

Representative national samples of the publics of the nine European Communities countries have repeatedly been asked, "In political matters people talk of 'the Left' and 'the Right.' How would you place your views on this scale?" When shown a scale with ten boxes ranging from "Left" to "Right," the overwhelming majority of respondents place themselves at some point on the scale, with little hesitation. These responses generally bear a coherent relationship to the respondents' other views. For example, in keeping with our concept of the core meaning of Left and Right, those who are most supportive of social change are very likely to place themselves toward the Left end of this scale.

A subjective sense of identification with the Left or the Right (or the Center) is widespread in Western Europe--but just what does it mean? It could, conceivably, be something similar to political party identification. In given countries, there is a consensus that given political parties are located at either the Left or the Right (or extreme Left, center or extreme Right). Originally, such images may have been based on the party's stand on salient issues, but over time they might well become stereotypes that do not necessarily bear much relationship to current issues. How widespread is this phenomenon?

A cross-national survey conducted in Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, Austria and the United States in 1974 asked the question about Left-Right self-placement cited above, and then followed it up with the open-ended question: "What does 'Left; mean to you?" . . . "What does 'Right' mean to you?" (for sampling information, see Barnes, Kaase et al., 1979). In the four European countries, from one-fifth to one-half of the respective samples defined "Left" by referring to specific political parties; a slightly larger proportion defined "Right" in the same way. Only about one percent of the American public responded with party labels: the terms Left and Right have come into widespread use only recently in the United States, and have not become generally accepted stereotypes for American political parties; but this <u>does</u> seem to be the case, to a considerable extent, in Western Europe.

One component of the meaning of the Left-Right dimension, then, seems to be the perception that given political parties are

linked with specific points on the continuum. This might reflect an accurate summary of each party's current position on key issues--but it could also be a stereotype that persists long after the events that gave a given party a given image.

It is clear, however, that (for a substantial share of the public, at least) the terms Left and Right have a meaning that goes beyond outdated stereotypes. In the 1974 surveys, in each country except Britain about half of the sample defined "Left" in terms of some ideology or with reference to more or less government, or to social or political change; and about 40 percent defined "Right" in similar broad, abstract terms.

But what is the current meaning of Left and Right in terms of specific issues? In order to answer this, let us examine the correlations between Left-Right self-placement, and the battery of items designed to measure preferences on both the classic economic issues, and some newer issues. To what extent have the new issues become assimilated to the Left-Right dimension? To what extent do the new and old issues give rise to separate axes of polarization?

Table 2 provides an answer to the first question. One's stand on the traditional economic issues show substantial correlations with Left-Right self-placement in every case: for example, those who were most supportive of greater efforts to reduce income inequality showed a marked tendency to place themselves on the Left.

(Table 2 about here)

But by 1979, the new issues were also integrated with the Left-Right orientation of both elites and mass publics to a truly impressive degree.

The general pattern is similar among both elites and publics: at both levels, the items that correlate most strongly with Left-Right self-placement are the top-loading items on the economic Left-Right dimension, and the non-economic Left-Right dimension respectively. In other words, our strongest indicators of both dimensions seem to have the greatest impact on whether an individual views himself as located on the Left or the Right.

But there are significant differences between elites and general publics. For one, these correlations are consistently stronger at the elite level than at the mass public level. On the average, we can explain four times as much variance in Left-Right self-placement at the elite level as at the mass level. This seems to provide unambiguous support for Converse's side of the long-standing debate on the Nature of Belief Systems Among Mass Publics (Converse, 1964, 1970, 1974; cf. Pierce and Rose, 1974). Constraint is much greater at the elite level, and since virtually identical questions were asked of both elites and general publics, the relatively low level of constraint among mass publics must be due to relatively low levels of political interest or other characteristics of the publics themselves, rather than to some artifact of the survey instrument, such as poor questionnaire construction.

Table 2

CORRELATION BETWEEN LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT AND POSITION ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AMONG WESTERN ELITES AND PUBLICS, 1979

(Pearson product-moment correlations)*

1. Among Candidates for European Parliament		2. Among Publics of Nine E.C. Nations	
Issue	r=	Issue	r=
More public ownership of industry	.617	Stronger defense effort	-.355
More gov't. management of economy	.599	Employees equal rep. on boards	.277
Stronger defense effort	-.553	Reduce income inequality	.271
More control over multi-nationals	.519	More public ownership of industry	.235
Reduce income equality	.502	Women should be free to choose abortion	.200
Women should be free to choose abortion	.474	Develop nuclear energy	-.200
More aid to Third World countries	.467	More severe anti-terrorist measures	-.198
More severe anti-terrorist measures	-.454	More gov't. management of economy	.198
Develop nuclear energy	-.454	More control over multi-nationals	.197
Employees equal rep. on boards	.342	Protect freedom of expression	.191
Stronger anti-pollution measures	.300	More aid to poorer regions of Europe	.176
Protect freedom of expression	.262	More aid to Third World countries	.174
More aid to poorer regions of Europe	.183	Stronger anti-pollution measures	.126

* Positive polarity indicates that those who support a given issue tend to place themselves on the Left. Based on pooled data from candidates from all nine nations, and publics from all nine nations, weighted according to population and (with the candidate data) according to party strength in the European Parliament.

Of more immediate interest, however, is the fact that the economic issues are more closely linked with the elite concept of Left-Right self-placement than are the non-economic issues. Among the general publics, however, the non-economic issues figure somewhat more prominently; indeed, the strongest predictor of mass Left-Right self-placement--by a wide margin--is one's attitude toward national defense.

The classic issues of government ownership and management of industry continue to define the terms "Left" and "Right" among political elites. These are the textbook examples of Left-Right issues, the stereotypes that figured prominently in the rhetoric and literature with which the elites were socialized. But the mass public has not read the classic literature. These issues do not have the same resonance among mass publics as among elites; for the public, the connotations of Left and Right seem to be more influenced by current events than is true of the elites. Thus, when we perform a factor analysis of issue orientations among the public, the same two dimensions emerge as among elites--but Left-Right self-placement tends to load on the new politics dimension, rather than on the economic issues factor, as Table 3 demonstrates. Among the general public the issue that showed the strongest correlation with Left-Right self-placement, was support or opposition to a stronger military defense effort. One would not expect this <u>a priori.</u>

(Table 3 about here)

At various times in the past, the relationship between Left and Right, and support for defense expenditures, seems to have

Table 3

ISSUE PREFERENCES AND LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT OF WESTERN PUBLICS: FACTOR ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION

(All loadings above .250 are shown)

I. Economic Left-Right		II. Non-economic Left-Right	
More economic aid to less developed regions	.615		
Larger government role in managing economy	.583	Stronger military defense effort	.694
Equal representation for employees and owners on boards	.576	More severe penalties for terrorism	.529
Greater effort to reduce income inequality	.559	Nuclear energy should be developed	.516
Stronger effort to protect free expression	.565	Women should be free to decide about abortion	-.346
More economic aid to Third World countries	.553	Equal representation for employees and owners on boards	-.300
More public ownership of industry	.514	Self-placement on Left-Right scale	.636
Stronger anti-pollution measures	.486		
Stronger public control over multi-nationals	.452		
Self-placement on Left-Right scale	-.260		

Source: Pooled data from Surveys of Publics of Nine E.C. nations carried out in April, 1979 (Euro-Barometer 11) sponsored by Commission of EC (N=8976). For sampling information see ICPSR Codebook for Euro-Barometer 11.

fluctuated and even reversed polarity. In the early phase of World War II, for example, Western communist parties opposed taking any part in the war, which was held to be a struggle of the ruling classes; after the invasion of the Soviet Union, partisans of the extreme Left reversed their position and became some of the most ardent advocates of an all-out effort against Hitler. In the United States, before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt and other liberals struggled desperately to build up the military preparedness of the United States and the West, against opposition that was particularly strong in conservative circles. Though the Japanese attack brought virtually unanimous support for the war effort, there was a reprise of the earlier situation after the war: conservative Republicans, championed by Robert Taft, advocated reduced defense expenditures and a withdrawal to Fortress America, while liberals supported a strong stand in the Cold War. This pattern seems to have persisted in the United States as recently as 1960, when Kennedy won victory over Nixon with a campaign that promised to close the "Missile Gap" and take a strong stand against Chinese threats to seize the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Accordingly, in his analyses of the issue positions taken by Western political parties from 1957 to 1962, Janda's expectation was that the parties of the Left would be relatively favorable to higher allocations to the military. He found that support for higher military allocations turned out to be linked with the Right rather than the Left, in the West as a whole, but the association was very modest (Janda, 1970). It was probably the war in Vietnam that brought a clear and strong

reversal of the earlier relationship. Opposition to the war became a major Post-Materialist cause, linked with humanitarian (rather than economic) concerns, and with opposition to the hierarchical authority patterns of industrial society. By the end of the 1970s, the military defense issue was--by a clear margin--the strongest correlate of Left-Right self-placement among Western publics. And such new issues as abortion, nuclear power and measures against terrorism showed correlations with Left-Right self-placement that were as high as, or higher than, those of a classic welfare state issue--the government role in the economy.

The absorptive power of the Left-Right concept is all the more impressive in view of the fact that attitudes toward nuclear power and terrorism showed quite weak correlations with Left-Right self-placement among older respondents; nevertheless, the relatively strong correlations among the young brought the overall figures up to the levels shown in Table 2. To be specific: among respondents aged 55 and over, the correlation between Left-Right self-placement, and attitudes toward nuclear power and terrorism (respectively) were: .118 and .090. Among those aged 15-34, the figures were .246 and .265. It seems that the linkage between these issues and mass Left-Right orientations is recent, and so far has fully penetrated only the younger groups. For the classic economic issues, on the other hand, age makes no difference: the old show correlations between Left-Right self-placement and economic issues that are as strong as, or stronger than those found among the young.

The relationship between issue positions and Left-Right self-placement among mass publics tends to be slightly curvilinear, which reduces the strength of the correlations in Table 2. Figures 2 and 3 show the mean levels of support for seven key issues, among respondents placing themselves at each of the ten points on our Left-Right ideological scale. Again, to economize space we pool the data from all nine European Community nations surveyed in 1979. Though interesting cross-national differences exist, the figures give a good idea of the general pattern. On these graphs, a mean score of 2.5 is the neutral point: a group with that score is evenly divided between support and opposition to the given proposal. A mean score of 3.0 could be obtained if 100 per cent of the people in a given group were "for" the measure; or if 50 per cent were "strongly for" and 50 per cent were "against;" or by various other combinations. A mean score of 3.5 could be obtained if 50 per cent of the respondents were "strongly for" the measure, the remaining 50 per cent were "for" it and no one were "against" or "strongly against" it: this reflects a very high level of support. A score of 4.0 could be obtained only if everyone in a given group were "strongly for" that particular measure: with at least several hundred thousands of respondents located at each of the ten points on our Left-Right scale, we never obtain such extreme scores.

(Figures 2 and 3 about here)

The curvilinearity we observe results mainly from the fact that the respondents who identify with the extreme Right, do not



Figure 2. Issue Positions and Left-Right Self-Placement among West European Publics, 1979.

hold the most conservative position on the various issues. This pattern is quite consistent. It is most pronounced in connection with attitudes toward expanding government regulation of the economy--where those placing themselves at the extreme Right (code 10 on our scale), take an issue position that is more "Leftist" than all but the two extreme Left categories (codes 1 and 2 on the scale). This pattern (shown in Figure 2) reflects the fact that the people located at both extremes of the scale tend to be dissatisfied with the way society and politics are functioning and feel that radical changes are needed--and are likely to see the government as the only possible instrument to achieve these changes. One implication is that, under extreme conditions, both the extreme Left and the extreme Right have a relatively high potential for Totalitarianism. Needless to say, government regulation is not totalitarian per se--but it may become so when carried to the point where government controls pervade every aspect of one's life. The two extremes of the political spectrum are relatively favorable to drastic change, and therefore to state intervention.

Curvilinearity is less extreme in connection with other issues. It disappears almost completely in attitudes toward environmental protection. But the absence of curvilinearity in this case, is linked with the fact that there is very little variation in attitudes toward protecting the environment: practically everyone is for it. Thus, despite the absence of curvilinearity, it shows a very weak relationship with Left-Right self-placement. When this issue is reformulated to focus on the trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth, we do obtain substantial variance--and then we do find a relatively strong relationship with Left-Right self-placement.



Figure 3. Issue Positions and Left-Right Self-Placement among West European Publics, 1979.

This curvilinear relationship between Left-Right self-placement and support for government control of the economy is not a transient fluke; the finding is replicated in the November, 1981 Euro-Barometer surveys. Here, again, only the two groups at the extreme Left (codes 1 and 2) are more favorable to increased government management of the economy than those who place themselves on the extreme Right (code 10). Attitudes toward public ownership also show a curvilinear tendency, though to a lesser degree; the extreme Right resembles those at the middle of the Left-Right continuum on this issue.

This curvilinear pattern characterizes our samples from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Ireland, when they are analyzed separately. It does not apply to Denmark on Greece: in these two countries, the extreme Right does take the extreme position on the classic economic issues. Interestingly enough, the two deviant cases fall at opposite extremes on the developmental spectrum; Greece is by far the poorest country among the nine, and Denmark the richest.

Curvilinearity in which the extreme Right turns back toward the Leftist position, is visible in connection with both of the other two economic issues; but it is a particularly strong feature of attitudes toward public ownership of industry (where the extreme Right holds attitudes similar to those of the center

Left); and relatively weak in connection with attitudes toward a more equal distribution of income. We suggested above that support for change in an egalitarian direction was the core meaning of the Left-Right super-issue. If this is true, it seems appropriate that attitudes toward reducing inequality of income, have the strongest correlation with Left-Right self-placement of all the classic economic issues.

A curvilinear tendency on the extreme Right also exists among the three issues depicted in Figure 3, though it is of negligible size in connection with attitudes toward terrorism. In the latter case, we again have a proposal that is backed by an overwhelming majority of the public: all segments of the Left-Right spectrum favor more severe penalties for acts of terrorism. There is a modest but perceptible curvilinearity at the extreme Right in attitudes toward military defense and toward developing nuclear energy, but the phenomena is less pronounced here than in connection with the classic economic issues.

Though the most sensitive indicators of both the old and new issue dimensions show strong linkages with Left-Right self-placement, the position of the extreme Right on these issues is anomalous. Those who see themselves at the extreme Right do <u>not</u> hold views at the opposite extreme from the views of the extreme Left--in some ways their views are relatively close. In part, Right extremism lies in the fact that its partisans feel extreme changes are needed--their position is not just a further extension of the conservative viewpoint.

Turning to cross-national comparisons, the evidence suggests that at high levels of economic development, public support for the classic economic policies of the Left tends to diminish. As Table 3A demonstrates, Greece is by far the poorest country among the ten European Community countries surveyed in 1981; and the Greek public has--by far--the highest level of support for both nationalization of industry and government management of the economy. At the opposite end of the developmental spectrum, Denmark is the richest of the nine countries, and the Danish public has the lowest level of support for these policies.

(Table 3A about here)

By purely economic criteria, France should rank fifth, but she actually ranks third in support for these policies--a fact that may be related to the remarkable electoral victories the French Left won in 1981. But this is the only anomaly: in all other respects there is a perfect fit between economic developmental level and support for the classic economic policies of the Left.

These findings are consistent with in our theoretical framework: the principle of diminishing marginal utility seems to apply at the national level as well as the individual level. Greece is an economically underdeveloped country, with extreme contrasts between rich and poor. In such a context, it seems likely that the balance between rich and poor can be redressed only by strong government intervention. Denmark, on the other hand, is a relatively rich country that has long since developed some of the most advanced social welfare policies in the world--

Table 3A

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE CLASSIC ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE LEFT AMONG PUBLICS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES (NOV., 1981)

Rank, in Support for "Left" Economic Policies	Nation	Support for: Public Ownership	Gov't. Management	Mean:	Gross National Product/ Capita (1979)
1.	Greece	1.60	1.25	1.43	$ 3,890
2.	Ireland	2.27	1.85	2.06	4,230
3.	France	2.58	1.95	2.27	10,030
4.	Italy	2.95	1.85	2.40	5,240
5.	United Kingdom	2.57	2.25	2.41	6,331
6.	Netherlands	2.94	1.98	2.46	10,240
7.	Belgium	2.92	2.21	2.57	10,890
8.	West Germany	2.72	2.47	2.60	11,730
9.	Denmark	3.20	2.45	2.83	11,900

Source: Euro-Barometer Survey number 16; for sampling information, see ICPSR Codebook. Data for Luxembourg are omitted because of small sample size (N=300).



Figure 4. Support for Nationalization of Industry, and for Developing Nuclear Power, among Electorates of West European political parties, 1979. Parties indicated by same symbol are members of same party federation in European Parliament.



Figure 5. Support for Further Nationalization of Industry, and for Developing Nuclear Power, among Candidates to European Parliament, 1979.

and one of the highest rates of taxation in the world. Over half of the Gross National Product is spent by the government. In Denmark, further redistribution by the government seems far less urgent than in Greece--and the costs of government intervention impinge on a very large share of the population. The incentives to press still farther with the traditional economic policies of the Left are relatively weak, and public resistance relatively strong.

Figure 4 shows how the electorates of specific political parties stand on the two issue dimensions; Figure 5 gives the same information for the candidates of these parties. Rather than give a composite score based on combined results for several issues, we have selected two specific issues that convey the overall picture through a concrete illustration. We have chosen the respective groups' attitudes toward further nationalization of industry as an example of the classic economic issues; and attitudes toward developing nuclear power, as an example of the new non-economic issues. A given party's aggregate stand on each of these issues is very strongly correlated with its stand on the other issues having high loadings on the same dimension. At the elite level, for example, we find a mean correlation of .76 between a given party's positions on nationalization of industry, government regulation, and redistribution of income. Similarly, there is a mean correlation of .84 between a given party's positions on nuclear power, defense and measures against terrorism. But the linkage between these two clusters is weak:

there is a mean correlation of only .16 between the two sets of issues.

(Figures 4 and 5 about here)

Accordingly, Figure 4 nor Figure 5 shows anything resembling a compact grouping of the parties along a Left-Right regression line (which would, theoretically, run from the upper Left corner to the lower Right corner of each figure). Quite the contrary, Figure 4 shows a scattering of party positions that is almost evenly distributed over the four quadrants. There is some tendency for the parties to be concentrated in the upper-Left and lower-Right quadrants, but to describe this pattern in terms of a unidimensional Left-Right polarization would be a grotesque oversimplication. Turning to the elite level, Figure 5 comes somewhat closer to unidimensionality, for the lower Left hand quadrant is almost empty: among candidates to the European Parliament, it is unusual to favor more nationalization of industry and the development of nuclear power; but two of Europe's largest parties fall into that category, with the French Communists constituting an extreme deviation, and the overall pattern is far from unidimensional.

A word of explanation is in order concerning the Belgian parties. Antagonism between the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking (or Walloon) segments of the population has led to the emergence of Flemish and Walloon nationalist parties, generally of relatively modest size but with deep historical roots. Since the late 1960's, ethnic cleavages have become more pronounced, dividing all significant parties (except the Communists) into

Flemish and Walloon sections that are now only loosely allied. The parties are labeled accordingly. The Flemish and Walloon sections of the respective parties take quite similar positions on the two dimensions dealt with here. They are divided by ethnic factors that constitute a distinct and independent dimension of political cleavage.

The only avowedly extreme-Right party with substantial numbers of voters--the Italian neo-Fascist party (MSI)--does not occupy the extreme lower right hand corner of either Figure. CLearly, it is located on the Right; but most of the European liberal parties are more conservative than it, on at least one of the two dimensions. Nevertheless, it does hold an extreme position in another sense: its electorate shows the highest level of political dissatisfaction among any of these parties, and one of the highest levels of support for revolutionary change.

Figure 4 demonstrates some interesting cross-national contrasts. As one would expect, the range of policy alternatives tends to be far greater in those countries having undiluted proportional representation, and a large number of parties. In particular, the Danish, Dutch and Italian parties show a relatively extreme dispersion in space, offering radically different ideological positions. By contrast, the leading parties of both Britain and Germany are concentrated in a compact area, as would be expected of relatively large, catch-all parties. But there is a significant contrast between these two countries: the electorates of the German parties take an almost

identical stand on the economic issue, and differ mainly on the non-economic issue; while with the British parties, it is exactly the other way around. The German public polarizes over the New Politics; the British public still polarizes along class lines--and accordingly, it shows much higher class-voting indices than the Germans.

Figure 5 shows far greater dispersion than Figure 4: in other words, the politicians of given parties take more extreme ideological positions than their electorates--confirming similar findings by previous investigators (Converse, 1975). FIgures 4 and 5 are presented in a way that actually understates the degree to which this is true. For the locations of the various electorates cluster relatively near the center of the issue space; in attitudes toward nuclear power, no electorate shows an aggregate score higher than approximately 3.75 or lower than 1.50. Consequently, in order to depict the parties' relative positions, we have eliminated the outer margins and enlarged the central area of Figure 4. Figure 5, on the other hand, depicts the entire possible issue space. The candidates of some parties are unanimously "strongly for" or "strongly against" given issues; some parties (the German Ecologists or the Danish Democratic Center, for example) unanimously take the most extreme possible position on both issues. The candidates of four different parties (three of them liberal parties) fall at the same point on the right-hand border of Figure 5. The attainment of these extreme scores is facilitated by the fact that some of these parties are represented by only two or three candidates;

but even some of the large parties, represented in our sample by many candidates, fall very near the extremes on one dimension or another: for example, the French Communists and Gaullists; the British Conservatives; and the Italian Christian Democrats. Thus, while the electorates of the principal British parties are concentrated in a very small portion of the total issue space, the candidates of these parties are separated by relatively large distances. The split that later took place in Britain's Labour Party, whereby the party elite lost the support of much of their electorate, seems to be foreshadowed by these data--for the elites take a position far to the Left of their electorate. While Conservative Party elites are located to the Right of their electorate, the distance is considerably smaller. By this standard the British Liberal Party would also appear to be in some danger--for its candidates are also located relatively far from their electorate.

On the whole, however, there is a close relationship between the issue positions of the electorate and elites of a given party. Table 4 gives the precise figures. Once again, we find that the most sensitive indicators of the two dimensions play a key role. The four strongest mass-elite correlations are found in connection with the two highest-loading issues on the economic Left-Right dimension shown in Table 1, and the two highest-loading issues on the non-economic issues dimension.

(Table 4 about here)

These issue correlations are handsome indeed. To interpret them, we should bear in mind that they are not intra-cranial

Table 4

CORRELATION BETWEEN ISSUE POSITIONS OF CANDIDATES OF GIVEN PARTY AND POSITION TAKEN BY ELECTORATE OF THAT PARTY

Develop nuclear power	.645
Stronger measures against terrorists	.607
More government management of economy	.547
More public ownership of industry	.543
Regional aid	.541
Stronger defense	.452
Codetermination	.447
Protection of individual rights	.435
Abortion should be available	.400
Reduce income inequality	.384
Anti-Pollution measures	.384
Aid Third World	.263
Control multinationals	.251

Source: Data set constructed using party as unit of analysis, based on aggregated responses of the given party's electorate (measured by reported voting intention) and aggregated responses of the given party's candidates to the European Parliament. Public was surveyed in April, 1979 (Euro-Barometer 11) and candidates were surveyed in March-May, 1979.

correlations that might conceivably be attributed to some methodological artifact such as response set. The correlations are based on two completely independent data sets, based on measurements at two different levels of the political system. Through they are aggregated to the group level (which tends to reduce the measurement error perennially present in survey data) the correlations found with our best indicators of the two dimensions are impressive. The .645 correlation between mass and elite attitudes toward nuclear power, for example, could be interpreted as meaning that nearly 42 per cent of the variance in the party elite's stand on this issue can be attributed to constituency influences. In fact, we do not believe that the causal linkage is that simple; part of it may represent the elites' influence on their electorate, for example; or the electorate may support given parties because of the stand they take on key issues, without influencing their issue positions. Furthermore, the linkages may be based on cues concerning the two broader issue dimensions, rather than the specific indicators.

We will not attempt to determine the specific causal connections that are involved here. For present purposes, our point is simply that strong linkages do exist between the positions that the electorates and candidates of given parties take on these issues. It is virtually inconceivable that this pattern could be due to chance alone. Either the politicians of given parties are influencing their electorates, or the electorates are influencing the candidates' positions on these issues; or the electorates are selectively recruited to support

given parties, partly as a function of their stand on these issues; or candidates with appropriate views are more apt to be recruited. Each of these factors probably plays a role--and all but the first one implies that public preferences have an impact on elite-level politics. The net result is a surprisingly close fit between the positions of the electorates and politicians of given parties, on these issues.

The two most sensitive indicators of the New Politics dimension and the two most sensitive indicators of the economically based Left-Right dimension, are the issues that show the strongest elite-mass linkages. But the New Politics issues show even stronger linkages than do the economic issues. Although West European political elites still tend to describe Left-Right political polarization primarily in terms of the classic issues of state ownership and control of the means of production, it appears that the electorates select their party more on the basis of the new issues than the old. Issue preferences explain only part of the variance in political party choice, of course; an even larger proportion may be due to long-term party affiliations and loyalties. But insofar as issues do influence party preferences, the new issues seem to have at least as much impact as the old.

We hypothesized that the new non-economic issues dimension reflects a Materialist versus Post-Materialist cleavage, rather than the social class and religious cleavages that gave rise to the conventional Left-Right dimension. Let us test that hypothesis.

(Table 5 about here)

Table 5 shows the strength of the relationship between the issue positions taken by the candidates of given parties, and the aggregate characteristics of the electorates of these parties. Again, these are not intra-cranial correlations. They reflect elite-mass linkages, based on independent measurements at each level; and the characteristics of the electorates were measured prior to measurement of the elite issue positions. Since the characteristics examined here tend to be relatively enduring features of given electorates, there are plausible grounds for inferring that they have a causal impact on elite attitudes (or lead to selective recruitment of the candidates).

The top half of Table 5 deals with three key economic issues. It demonstrates that, among the three types of characteristics examined here, religiosity has the greatest impact. Not only has the religious factor been assimilated to the conventional Left-Right dimension--it actually outweighs social class as an influence on attitudes toward economic issues. The finding that religion outweighs social class in its electoral impact in most Western nations, seemed surprising in the context of prevailing social theory. The fact that religion outweighs social class in its impact on attitudes toward specifically economic issues, may seem more surprising still. Materialist/ Post-Materialist values also seem to have a significant impact on these attitudes, but their impact is clearly weaker than that of religiosity, and much weaker than the socio-religious variables combined.

Table 5

CORRELATION BETWEEN POLICIES SUPPORTED BY CANDIDATES OF A GIVEN PARTY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THAT PARTY'S ELECTORATE*

Characteristics of Electorate	1. Economic Issues: More government management of the economy	More public ownership of industry	Reduce income inequality	Mean correlation, 3 issues
Percentage of Manual workers among electorate	.325	.224	.120	.223
Church attendance rate among electorate	.460	.621	.480	.520
Ratio of Materialists to Post-Materialists among electorate	-.180	-.510	-.306	-.332

	2. Non-economic Issues: Develop Nuclear Power	Stronger Defense effort	Stronger measures against Terrorists	Mean correlation, 3 issues
Percentage of manual workers among electorate	-.017	-.077	+.086	-.003
Church attendance rate among electorate	-.554	-.414	-.448	-.472
Ratio of Materialists to Post-Materialists among electorate	.677	.512	.670	.620

* Data on electorates based on cumulative results of Euro-Barometers 3-12; Candidates' positions based on interviews with Candidates to European Parliament representing 66 parties in 9 nations.

Figure 6

CORRELATES OF ISSUE POSITIONS TAKEN BY CANDIDATES OF SIXTY-SIX PARTIES FROM NINE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES





Source: Issue Battery Included in Survey of 742 Candidates to European Parliment Interviewed in Spring, 1979 (See Inglehart et al., 1980); and Data on Electorates From Cumulative results of Euro-Barometer Surveys 3-12.

At the individual level, Materialist/Post-Materialist values have an ambivalent relationship to the issues linked with the conventional economic Left-Right dimension. Post-Materialist respondents are only slightly more favorable to redistribution of income than are Materialists--though the former are markedly more favorable to increasing economic aid to Third World countries. This may be because the two groups favor income redistribution for different reasons. Despite their relatively high income levels, Post-Materialists may favor redistriburion for the sake of human solidarity; on the other hand, lower-income Materialists may favor income redistribution because (to some extent) they are the ones who benefit from it. The situation is less ambiguous with regard to aid to Third World countries: here, neither group stands to gain material benefits--and the Post-Materialists are much more favorable than the Materialists.

In keeping with their general tendency to support the positions of the Left, Post-Materialists are somewhat likelier to favor nationalization of industry than are Materialists. But Post-Materialists are slightly less likely to favor a greater government role in managing the economy. For the old Left, government ownership, regulation and control of the economy were inherently good; almost by definition, a larger government role was desirable, in almost any situation. FOr the Post-Materialists Left, big government is inherently dangerous. Like any large, hierarchical bureaucratic organization, it tends to encroach on individual autonomy and self-expression.

This fact poses a dilemma for the Post-Materialist Left. They tend to favor social change; and almost any program of social change presupposes that the government, necessarily, will be the instrument to bring it about. But the Post-Materialist Left--far more than the traditional Left--regards the state as a potential instrument of oppression and exploitation. Though they favor equality, they are somewhat reluctant to use the state to bring it about. One way out of this dilemma (conceivably) might be through decentralizing the state. Hence, Post-Materialists strongly tend to favor regional autonomy: in the November 1981 Euro-Barometer surveys, 36 per cent of the Materialists were "strongly for" greater regional autonomy, as compared with 51% of the Post-Materialists in the ten-nation European Community. Big government may be necessary to social change, but the Post-Materialist Left is ambivalent toward it.

On the other hand, the relationship between Materialist/ Post-Materialist values and the non-economic issues loading on the second dimension, is clear and unequivocal: Materialists are more than twice as likely to favor a stronger defense effort as are Post-Materialists; and almost twice as likely to favor developing nuclear power, or taking stronger measures against terrorism. The differences between Materialists and Post-Materialists on these issues are large and consistent, both from issue to issue and from nation to nation.

When we turn to the lower half of Table 5, we find indications that these preferences have a political impact. Consistently and by a clear margin, the ratio of Materialists to

Post-Materialists among the electorate is the strongest predictor of candidate attitudes toward the non-economic issues. The value preferences of the electorate easily outweigh the impact of both the religious and social class indicators combined, partly, because the latter effect is negligible--the linkage between the social class composition of a party's electorate and their candidate's stand on non-economic issues, is about as close to zero as one can get. Our religious indicator, on the other hand, does seem to have a significant impact.

The persistence of an apparently flourishing linkage between religious affiliations and political cleavages, coupled with a truly remarkable decline of social class cleavages, may seem paradoxical. But it is very much in keeping with the theoretical framework underlying this analysis. For reasons that we have discussed earlier in some detail (Inglehart, 1977: 217-222), the rise of Post-Materialist politics has an inherent tendency to neutralize class-based political cleavages, but it does <u>not</u> have that impact on religious cleavages; on the contrary, it may even give them new life. For Post-Materialists tend to be recruited from the more affluent strata that traditionally supported the Right, but they themselves tend to support the Left (and may engender a working class reaction that moves toward the Right). In other words, Post-Materialism tends to reverse the polarity of the correlation between social class and the Left-Right dimension. But it does <u>not</u> have this impact on religion: Post-Materialists tend to be recruited from the non-practicing segment of the religious spectrum, which traditionally has supported the

Left, and continues to do so. Furthermore, Post-Materialist support for cultural change may stimulate a conservative reaction on the part of those holding traditional religious values--reinforcing, rather than weakening, their alignment with the Right. The rise of a new kind of value-based politics may give new relevance to much older value-based cleavages, rooted in the pre-industrial era (Pappi, 1977).

4. Group Polarization and Party Alignments.

We hypothesize that a process of intergenerational value change has led to the emergence of a new basis of support for political change--but that its impact on electoral behavior is retarded by the inertia of established party loyalties and group affiliations.

In order to test this hypothesis, we need to distinguish between the traditional socioeconomic Left-Right dimension, and support or opposition to the established order. It is not an easy task, for the two tend to be lumped together: the term "Left" connotes support for sociopolitical change and support for specific political parties. Just how closely the two actually are linked is an empirical question, and probably varies within a given population. Among the ideologically sensitive, support or opposition to the established order may be an important component of one's orientation toward Left and Right. Among those who are ideologically less aware, support for the "Left" or "Right" may be largely a matter of group affiliations and partisan loyalties, with little reference to support or opposition to types of political change that have only recently become salient.

The labels "Left" and "Right" have been a staple part of political discourse for many decades, particularly in Europe. To some extent, support for a party of the "Left" undoubtedly does reflect an ideology of opposition to the existing sociopolitical order, which is what interests us at present. But insofar as the Left-Right labels are contaminated by a party identification component, they would not necessarily reflect one's attitude toward social change. We must try to distinguish between these two components of the excessively broad and all-inclusive Left-Right dimension, one based on long-term partisan loyalties and the other on one's attitude toward social change.

One's rating of the key groups that are active in contemporary politics should provide a means of making this distinction. For evidence on this score, let us turn to data from an eight-nation study of political action, fieldwork for which was carried out in 1974-1976 (for details, see Barnes, Kaase et al., 1979). Each person interviewed in the eight national samples was asked to indicate how friendly or unfriendly his feelings were toward various groups in his society, using a "feeling thermometer" that ranged from a score of zero (indicating extremely cold feelings) to 100 (extremely friendly feelings). Our objective was to develop indices of each respondent's position for or against the groups shown in Table 6. In doing so, an important concern was to remove a general "response-set" tendency from the thermometer ratings--that is, a pronounced tendency for some individuals to give all groups consistently high or low ratings.

(Table 6 about here)

To remove this "response-set" tendency the average rating across all groups was computed for each respondent. This mean score was then subtracted from the thermometer rating of each group. Thus, for each respondent some groups are evaluated negatively (below the respondent's average) while other groups are valued positively. These adjusted thermometer ratings were then used in constructing factor score indices. Factor analysis of these ratings revealed a consistent pattern, with two basic dimensions underlying responses in each of the eight nations studied. As Table 6 indicates, we find a Left-Right partisanship factor in each country, based on ratings of the most important conservative party in that nation, as well as the rating of the most important party on the Left side of the political spectrum. The specific parties rated, in each respective country, were as follows:

	Main Left Party	Main Right Party
Britain	Labour Party	Conservative
Germany	Social Democratic Party	Christian Democratic Party
The Netherlands	Labour Party	Liberal Party
Austria	Socialist Party	People's Party (former Christian Social)
United States	Democratic Party	Republican Party
Italy	Communist Party	Christian Democratic Party
Switzerland	Socialist Party	Radical Party
Finland	Social Democratic Party	National Coalition Party

Ratings of key institutions linked with the respective parties also have significant loadings on this factor, which simultaneously taps one's partisan loyalties and one's sympathies in the long-standing opposition between labor and management.

In those countries with major Christian Democratic parties, one's rating of the clergy also loads on this factor, forming

Table 6

LEFT-RIGHT GROUP SYMPATHIES AND ESTABLISHMENT/ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT ATTITUDES IN EIGHT NATIONS

(Factor analysis using Varimax rotation; based on "feeling thermometer" scores)*

	United States		Britain		The Netherlands		Germany		Austria		Italy		Switzerland		Finland	
Ratings of:	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.	Left/ Right	Est./ Anti-Est.
Left Party	.70		.80		.75		.75		.81		.71	-.31			.49	
Labor Unions	.58		.75		.66	.32	.64		.71		.61		.79		.64	
Big Business	-.37	.39	-.54		-.59	.31	-.63		-.39			.61		.42	-.62	
Right Party	-.64		-.76		-.78		-.81		-.82		-.67	.31	-.54		-.73	
Clergy		.58		.51	-.52	.39	-.67		-.64		-.61			.49		.53
Police		.72		.61		.69		.76		.65		.68		.64		.64
Civil Servants	.30	.46		.37		.54		.57		.57	-.40			.52	-.33	.34
Small Business		.37		.36	-.34			.48				.56				.44
Minority Group**						-.31				-.37		-.46				-.30
Women's Liberation		-.57		-.44		-.68	.41					-.40	.34		.46	
Student Protesters		-.76		-.70		-.45		-.71		-.71		-.60		-.62		-.63
Revolutionary Gps.		-.71		-.67		-.69		-.71		-.67		-.69		-.61		-.69

*The scores on the feeling thermometer were adjusted for response set by subtracting the individual's mean rating for all groups from his rating of any given group. All loadings above .30 are shown.

**"Foreign workers" in The Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Switzerland; "workers from the South" in Italy; "blacks" in the United States; "colored immigrants" in Britain; "gypsies" in Finland.

Source: Eight-nation Political Action study, carried out 1973-1976. For details of fieldwork, see Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, Political Action: An Eight Nation Study (Cologne: Zentralarchiv, 1979). Findings from five nations are reported in Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase et al., Political Action (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).

part of the cluster containing management and the most important political party of the Right. This holds true for The Netherlands, even though the "Right" party actually rated by the Dutch respondents was not church-related (they rated the Liberals instead). It does not hold true in Switzerland, though that country does have important church-linked parties. But this is not the only anomaly in the way group sympathies polarize in Switzerland: the dimension based on opposition between Left and Right, labor and management, that we find almost everywhere else, is strangely deformed in Switzerland. For one thing, the major Left party does not load on this factor. Though this is indeed anomalous, it seems to reflect the reality of Swiss politics quite accurately. For more than a generation, Switzerland has been governed by a cartel of the four major parties, with the Socialists part of a virtually permanent coalition that also includes the three major parties of the Right. If mass sympathies do not polarize between the Socialists and Radicals, it may be because the parties themselves do not polarize in their behavior. In Switzerland, Left-Right polarization is reduced to a truncated opposition between the Radical party and the labor unions (with a minor contribution from the women's liberation movement).

The cleavages between labor and management, and between religious and secular publics, have been part of the political scene for many decades; they seem to have been incorporated into the traditonal Left-Right (or liberal-conservative) dimension underlying Western politics, so that one's loyalties tend to lie

with one set of groups or another in a predictable and by now institutionalized pattern.

But new issues and new groups have become politically salient in recent years. One's reaction to these groups forms the basis of a second major dimension of sociopolitical cleavage. One tends to sympathize with the women's liberation movement, student protestors, foreign workers and revolutionary groups on one hand; or with the police, civil servants and other elements of the established social order (including the clergy, in those countries where the church does not have formal ties with the dominant parties of the Right). One's position on this dimension is largely unrelated to one's partisan loyalties. The two dimensions seem to reflect: (1) the traditional socioeconomic Left-Right cleavage, with an infrastructure based on the polarization between labor and management (with religious cleavages also assimilated to this dimension, in some countries), and (2) an Establishment/Anti-Establishment (or New Politics) dimension, based on one's reaction to groups that have become politically prominent much more recently than organized labor--and, we suspect, are more active carriers of support for social change.

While the pattern is remarkably consistent cross-nationally, Italy's configuration is unique. One one hand, the polarization between the Communist and Christian Democratic parties appears not only on the Left-Right partisan dimension, but also on the Establishment/Anti-Establishment dimension. In contrast with Switzerland (where neither dimension shows the full Left-Right

party polarization), in Italy both dimensions reflect polarization according to party preference. While in Switzerland, the Left has permanently shared power, in Italy the main party of the Left (the Italian Communist Party) had been permanently excluded from power, with the Christian Democrats continuously in office from the end of World War II up to the time of our survey. Hence, in Italy, partisan conflict is not distinct from support for social change--on the contrary, partisan change may seem a prerequisite for any basic social change. Italy is unique, furthermore, in that attitudes toward the civil service are not linked with the Establishment/Anti-Establishment factor (as everywhere else) but with the Left-Right partisan factor. Here, the electorate reacts to the civil service as if it were linked with the Christian Democratic Party--again, a rather accurate reflection of political reality (in this case, the colonization of the civil service).

The Establishment/Anti-Establishment factor shows a distinctive feature in one other country as well: The Netherlands. In addition to a perfectly normal polarization on the Left-Right partisanship dimension, both labor unions and big business show significant loadings on the Establishment/Anti-Establishment dimension--and here they share the same polarity: both are seen as Establishment groups. This may reflect The Netherlands' highly developed system of corporatist involvement of both labor and management organizations in the shaping of economic policy. In other respects, the polarization of group

sympathies in The Netherlands conforms to the pattern that prevails generally among these eight nations.

In six of the eight nations, political polarization corresponds to our expectations very closely: we find a Left-Right partisanship dimension, intimately linked with one's attitudes toward labor and management (and the Church, in those countries where the church has traditionally played a major role). Alongside this dimension, an independent second dimension taps support for radical and non-Establishment groups--or for the established authorities. In two countries, the structure of group sympathies deviates from the general pattern--in Switzerland, through an absence of partisan polarization; and in Italy, because party polarization is everywhere.

The two dimensions in Table 6 are uncorrelated, since we have used varimax rotation in factor-analyzing the group sympathy ratings. This technique enables us to separate a theoretically new and independent axis of polarization from the effects of political party loyalties that would otherwise be superimposed upon it. Let us now examine the empirical relationship between these two dimensions and one's political party preferences, propensities for political action, and social background characteristics. In doing so, we should bear in mind that, while the two dimensions of Table 6 are deliberately constrained to be uncorrelated, the variables introduced in subsequent analyses are not. Thus, as Table 7 illustrates, across the eight nations, both one's political party identification and one's vote in the last national election are strongly correlated with one's

factor score on the Left-Right group sympathies dimension. This is certainly not surprising. But these variables also show significant correlations with Establishment/Anti-Establishment sympathies. Those who vote for the Left tend to have anti-Establishment sympathies, but the linkage is modest. It becomes significantly stronger, however, when we move from direct indicators of political party ties to a more issue-related variable: Left-Right self-placement.

(Table 7 about here)

Self-placement on the Left-Right ideological scale, we argued, reflects a mixture of party loyalties and ideological position, with the former predominating. The data in Table 7 tend to support this interpretation. For Left-Right self-placement has a far stronger linkage with the first (party-related) dimension than with the second--which, we argued, is the more sensitive indicator of current support for social change. But because Left-Right self-placement does tend to reflect current issues, its linkage with the second dimension is stronger than that found with either of the party-based variables. Table 7 also confirms the interpretation that the second dimension is the better indicator of support for change. For it includes results from a Protest Potential scale, based on approval of an escalating series of protest actions, and on reports of actual behavior (for a detailed description see Barnes, Kaase et al., 1979: pp. 65-81). While our Protest Potential Scale shows significant correlations with both dimensions, its linkage with the Establishment/Anti-Establishment dimension is clearly the

stronger of the two. Contemporary political protest seems much less likely to spring from a pro-labor stance than from alignment with other non-establishment groups.

Table 8 summarizes the overall relationship between our two group-sympathy dimensions and three types of social background variables that tap industrial, pre-industrial and post-industrial cleavages respectively. The results show an almost perfect parallel to the pattern we found in Table 5 above. Like the economic issues dimension, the conventional Left-Right group sympathies dimension reflects the religious variable above all, with our indicators of value priorities and social class each making lesser but significant contributions to one's sense of group alignment. And like the non-economic issues dimension, one's position on the Establishment/Anti-establishment dimension reflects the respondent's value priorities far more than either of the other two variables (and more than both of them combined); religion has an appreciable impact here (as in Table 5), but the role of social class drops to an almost negligible level --again, in parallel with what happens with the New Politics issue dimension. Insofar as there <u>is</u> any linkage, the lower economic strata tend to side with the Establishment groups--a reversal of the polarity that is taken for granted in class-based models of political protest. Is the Establishment/Anti-Establishment group sympathies dimension an aspect of the New Politics, as seems to be true of the non-economic issues dimension analyzed above? We believe it is; and if that is the case, then it (like the new issues dimension) should be a more prominent feature of the

Table 7

CORRELATES OF THE LEFT-RIGHT GROUP SYMPATHIES DIMENSION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT/ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT DIMENSION

(Mean Product-moment Correlations for Eight National Samples)

	Left-Right Group Sympathies	Establishment/ Anti-Establishment Sympathies
Political Party Identification	.644	-.164
Vote in Last Election	.598	-.152
Left-Right Self-Placement	.465	-.238
Protest Potential Score	-.208	.364

Table 8

SOCIAL BACKGROUND CORRELATES OF THE LEFT-RIGHT GROUP SYMPATHIES DIMENSION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT/ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT DIMENSION

(Mean product-moment correlations for eight national samples)

	Left-Right Sympathies	Establishment/ Anti-Establishment Sympathies
Materialist/Post-Materialist Values	-.187	.316
Church attendance	-.225	.145
Occupational prestige, head of household	.145	.061

Source: Eight-nation Political Action study.

political behavior of the younger age cohorts than of older groups, whose political outlook was formed in an era of pronounced social class conflict. Let us examine the evidence.

(Table 9 about here)

Table 9 shows the correlations between our three social background characteristics, and voting behavior among the 12,588 respondents interviewed in the representative cross-sections of the publics of the eight nations included in the Political Action study. The figures given here represent the mean correlations obtained for each of three age groups in each of the eight nations. The pattern varies from country to country; relatively small differences between age groups were found in Great Britain, where class voting persists to a relatively great degree even among younger respondents--a finding in keeping with the fact that Britain has experienced relatively slow economic growth during recent decades, and shows relatively little evidence of intergenerational value change. (For a more detailed discussion of these cross-national findings, see Inglehart, forthcoming). Nevertheless for the eight nations as a whole, the social background variables show three contrasting patterns. In keeping with Hypothesis 8, social class (as indicated by the occupational prestige rating of the head of household) has much more impact on voting among the oldest age group than among the youngest. Conversely, Materialist/Post-Materialist values seem to be a much stronger influence on the voting behavior of the young than on that of the old. Finally, the religious factor shows scarcely any variation across age groups.

Table 9

CORRELATES OF VOTE IN LAST ELECTION BY AGE GROUP

(Mean product-moment correlation for eight national samples)

	AGES		
	16-39	40-59	60+
Materialist/Post-Materialist Values	-.21	-.15	-.14
Church attendance	-.30	-.28	-.30
Occupational Prestige	.13	.20	.26

Source: Political Action Study.

Only time series data can demonstrate the point directly, but here again the evidence points to the conclusion that social class voting tends to decline as the impact of the Materialist/ Post-Materialist cleavage grows stronger; and that the latter process has little effect on religious voting.

5. The Impact of Social Cleavages on Three Types of Political Polarization.

We hypothesized that the impact of Post-Materialism would be greatest on those forms of political polarization that are least strongly linked with established political party loyalties. Thus, we would expect its impact to be weakest on voting behavior--a relatively direct expression of party loyalties; and relatively strong on support for social change, a super-issue that has no explicit linkage with party ties. Conversely, if it is true that social class conflict was a more important factor a generation ago than it is today, it would be preserved most fully in those forms of polarization most directly linked with the pattern-preserving influence of long-term party loyalties: the impact of social class on voting should be far stronger than its impact on support for social change. As a hybrid variable reflecting both a partisanship component and an ideological component that sums up one's position on current issues, Left-Right self-placement should occupy an intermediate position between voting and support for social change.

As the first step in testing this hypothesis, let us examine the absolute impact of social class, religion and individual values on each of the three types of political polarization.

Table 10 shows how each of the three social cleavages relate to voting patterns, in a pooled sample based on the Euro-Barometer surveys carried out in the middle and late 1970s, weighted according to population. This sample, of course, fails to convey the wealth of variation in the social background characteristics of the scores of parties in nine different countries. It groups parties together into two broad categories--the "Left" (the various Communist, Socialist, and Social Democratic parties); and the "Right" (the various Christian Democratic Conservative and some other parties). A minority (about 9 per cent of those reporting a party preference) are not classified: the centrist and ethnic nationalist parties, are excluded, for example, and the Liberal parties are split between some that seem clearly part of the Right, and others that are considered Centrist, and excluded from these tables. Detailed information on how each party is coded appears in the ICPSR codebooks for the Euro-Barometer surveys.

Though it fails to convey a vast number of interesting details, this massive pooled sample does provide an exceptionally reliable data base for analysis of overall patterns of political polarization in Western Europe.

(Table 10 about here)

As Table 10 reveals, class voting was still fairly strong in Western Europe in the late 1970's: the Alford Class Voting Index was +18 for the European Community as a whole. While this is well below the levels reported for most West European countries in the 1950's, it is still an important feature of political

Table 10

ELECTORAL CLEAVAGES BASED ON SOCIAL CLASS, RELIGION AND PERSONAL VALUES IN WESTERN EUROPE

(Percentage Voting for Parties of the Left, 1973-1979)

	% Voting for Left	N
1. Social Class Voting		
Respondents from families headed by manual worker	63%	(21,616)
Respondents from families with head having non-manual occupation	45	(24,594)
Alford class-voting index	+18	
2. Religious Voting		
Respondent attends church at least once a week	27	(13,360)
Respondent attends church a few times a year	49	(20,290)
Respondent never attends church	65	(10,174)
3. Value-based Voting		
Respondent has Materialist priorities	43	(16,777)
Respondent has Mixed priorities	53	(23,180)
Respondent has Post-Materialist priorities	71	(4,678)

Based on pooled results from each of the nine-nation European Community surveys carried out from 1973 through 1979 (Euro-Barometers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12), weighted according to population of given nation.

cleavages in Western Europe. It is clear from Table 10 that religious cleavages are also very strong. Since there is some ambiguity about just where to draw the cutting line with church attendance, we will not attempt to construct an index analogous to the Alford Index, but will compare the relative strengths of the respective cleavages through a Multiple Classification Analysis, below. Finally, Table 10 indicates that the voting behavior of the various value types is quite distinctive; indeed, if we were to simply compare the voting intentions of the pure Materialist type (based on the original four-item values index), we would obtain a larger percentage difference than that found with social class. But our values indicator is not dichotomous: over half of those reporting a preference for parties grouped with the Left or the Right, fall into the mixed values type; while the Post-Materialist type shows quite distinctive voting behavior, the sheer percentage differences would convey an exaggerated impression of the impact of values on voting behavior. Multiple Classification Analysis alleviates this problem, by calculating coefficients that are weighted according to the number of cases in each category of the independent variables.

Table 11 shows the percentage differences associated with self-placement on the Left-Right scale. While the differences linked with church attendance and value type remain quite large, those associated with social class shrink to only 8 percentage points.

Table 11

LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT, ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CLASS,

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND PERSONAL VALUES

(Percentage placing selves on Left half [codes 1-5]
of Left-Right scale, 1973-1979)

	% Placing Selves on Left	N
1. By Social Class		
Manual head of family	61%	(23,498)
Non-manual head of family	53	(29,459)
2. By religious Practice		
Respondent attends church at least once a week	42	(14,613)
Respondent attends church a few times a year	52	(22,760)
Respondent never attends church	63	(11,529)
3. By Value Priorities		
Materialist	45	(20,891)
Mixed	55	(29,788)
Post-Materialist	75	(6,296)

Source: Pooled results of the 1973-1979 European Community surveys.

Table 12

SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE, BY SOCIAL CLASS, RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND PERSONAL VALUES, 1976-1979*

	Respondent favors:				
	Revolutionary Change	Gradual Reform	Defense of Present Society		N
1. By Social Class					
Manual	8%	62%	30%	100%	(17,579)
Non-manual	7	64	29	100	(24,025)
2. By Religious Practice					
Attends church at least weekly	4	60	36	100	(9,865)
Attends church a few times a year	5	60	35	100	(16,473)
Never attends church	9	61	30	100	(7,981)
3. By Value Priorities					
Materialist	4	57	38	99	(18,292)
Mixed	8	62	30	100	(26,694)
Post-Materialist	17	69	14	100	(6,098)

*Based on pooled results from Euro-Barometers 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 weighted according to population of given nation.

(Tables 11 and 12 about here)

Finally, Table 12 shows the relationship of social class, church attendance and value type, with support for social change. With all three independent variables, a Reformist majority prevails. But even a cursory inspection of this table suggests that one's values are the dominant factor. There is virtually no difference whatever in the degree to which manual and non-manual respondents support social change: the former group is one point more likely to favor revolutionary change, but it is also one point more likely to favor defense of the present society. Religion, on the other hand, does seem to have an appreciable impact on this orientation: those who never attend church are about twice as likely to support revolutionary change as those who attend church weekly; and somewhat less likely to favor defense of the established social order. But the differences associated with value type are substantially greater. Post-Materialists are four times as likely to favor revolutionary change as are Materialists; and a great deal less likely to favor defending the present society.

(Table 13 about here)

Now let us compare the impact of the three social background variables on each of the three types of political polarization. Table 14 gives the results of a Multiple Classification Analysis based on these data. The Eta coefficients show the relative strength of each predictor variable, weighted for the number of cases in each category; while the Beta coefficients provide a similar statistic, controlling for the effects of each of the

Table 13

POLITICAL CLEAVAGES BASED ON SOCIAL CLASS, RELIGION AND PERSONAL VALUES:
(Multiple Classification Analyses)

	Eta	Beta
1. Left-Right Voting		
Church attendance	.264	.242
Social class	.179	.162
Value priorities	.141	.126
2. Left-Right Self-Placement		
Church attendance	.201	.195
Value priorities	.188	.179
Social class	.095	.084
3. Support for Social Change		
Value priorities	.185	.172
Church attendance	.111	.094
Social class	.032	.020

Source: Pooled data from European Community surveys carried out 1973-1979 (1976-1979 with support for social change).

other two predictor variables. The relative strength of the Beta coefficients is shown in graphic form in Figure 6.

(Figure 6 about here)

As we hypothesized, the net impact of social class on voting behavior outweighs that of value type--though our religious indicator shows a stronger effect than either of them. But when we turn to support for social change, values are the strongest predictor by a wide margin; the impact of social class is negligible, while religous practice has a significant effect (though only about half as strong as that of values). Left-Right self placement shows a pattern consistent with our characterization of it as a hybrid of partisanship and ideological variables: religion has the strongest impact, followed by values and social class.

The pattern obtained here is by now familiar. As was true in connection with issue polarization and the two group sympathies dimensions, the evidence supports the interpretation that a new axis of political polarization has arisen in relatively recent years, and that it reflects an oppostion between Materialist and Post-Materialist goals. While political party loyalties remain tied to the social class-based axis, they tend to be out of phase with a New Politics cleavage.

6. Conclusion.

Building the welfare state and restoring economic growth were, understandably, the dominant political concerns of the 1930's and the postwar era. In the late 1960's and 1970's, Post-Materialist forces captured the issue agenda of the West European



Figure 6. The Impact of Religion, Social Class and Values on three types of Political Polarization. Height of each bar is proportional to Beta coefficients in Multiple Classification Analysis of 9-nation sample.

Left and of American Liberals. The effects of this coup have not yet been assimilated into either the rhetoric or the party alignments of Western nations.

Protest has become divorced from partisanship, to a remarkable degree. Two main axes of political polarization exist side by side, with the leading parties aligned along the familiar Left-Right axis based on religion and social class, in uneasy coexistence with a largely independent polarization between Materialists and Post-Materialists--who continue to dominate the issue arena. Since the first OPEC oil shock, in 1973, Western economies have functioned in an atmosphere of insecurity and diminishing expectations. But though everyone assumes that the issues of the 1980's will be economic issues, the ones that evoke political activism today are still largely Post-Materialist ones.

The rise of Post-Materialism has placed existing party alignments under chronic stress. For in most countries, these alignments do not correspond to either the social bases of support for change, or to polarization over the most heated issues.

The resulting stress can be resolved in various ways (1) Dealignment: there may be a gradual decline of party loyalty and party identification, in so far as the most salient issues no longer provide an incentive that attaches new voters to existing parties; (2) Realignment: existing parties may split, or be taken over by reorienting elites.

There is yet another possibility. The new axis of polarization based on Materialist/Post-Materialist values, may

decline in importance; or--more likely--it may be assimilated into a new synthesis.

A Materialist consensus provided the rationale and the legitimating myth of industrial society. Its Post-Materialist antithesis has not yet led to the emergence of a new synthesis. But it seems likely that the wave of the future is not undiluted acceptance of Post-Materialist goals. The Post-Materialists brought into the political arena a number of issues that had been largely ignored and neglected; in doing so, they help correct a course that tended to sacrifice the quality of life to one-sided economic considerations. But carried to an extreme, Post-Materialism can be equally self-defeating. The anti-industrial outlook of some of the movement's ideologues could lead to a neglect of the economic base on which Post-Materialism ultimately depends. In the long run, a new synthesis of Materialist and Post-Materialist orientations will emerge because it must.

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